judgements (Frege), aka assertions (Russell)
= the affirmation [meta language] of some proposition A [object language]
= the premises and conclusions of logical inference
 can be evident/proven/known, or not
basic forms:
 A is true  (e.g.
 A & B is true  ) ,
 A is false  ,
 A is proposition


formally:
  A 
  A & B 
 ? 
  A <>

footnote:
Ramsey's redundance theory of truth [x]
claims that the truthpredicate 'is true' is superfluous,
based on the (apparent) equivalence between
asserting a proposition p
and asserting p is true.
«Difficulties appear to arise for the theory from cases in
which propositions are said to be true even though the
speaker may not know which propositions they are, and so
cannot assert them himself, or when there are too many
such propositions for each to be asserted individually, for
example when someone claims 'Something that John said
yesterday is true' or 'Everything asserted by a Cretan is true'»
[x]

[Löf]: «It seems to have been Bolzano who took the crucial step of replacing
the Aristotelean forms of judgement
by the single form
A is, 
A is true,
 or  A holds.

In this, he was followed by Brentano, who also introduced the opposite form
and Frege.»
MartinLöf additionaly considers
A prop.,
 or  A is a proposition.

«And through Frege's influence, the whole of modern logic
has come to be based on the single form of `judgement', or `assertion',
A is true.
Once this step was taken, the question arose, What sort thing is it that
is affirmed in an `affirmation' and denied in a `denial'?
that is, What sort of thing is the A here?
The isolation of this concept ...
was a step which was entirely necessary for the development of modern logic.
Modern logic simply would not work unless we had this concept,
because it is on the things that fall under it that the logical operations operate.
This new concept, which simply did not exist before the last century, was variously called.
And since it was something that one had not met before. one had difficulties
with what one should call it. Among the terms that were used,
I think that the least committing one is ... `content of a judgement' ...
Bolzano, who was the first to introduce this concept,
called it `proposition in itself' ...
Frege also grappled with this terminological problem.
In Begriffsschrift, he called it `judgeable content' ...
Now, Russell used the term `proposition' for this new notion,
which has become the standard term in AngloSaxon philosophy and in modern logic.
... And [he chose] the word `assertion'
rather than translate [Frege's] Urteil literally by `judgement'.»
The terms `judgement'/`assertion' can refer to many things [Löf]:
 the act of judging/asserting (`judgement' in the traditional sense),
or
 that which is judged/asserted, an ``object of knowledge'':
 A judgement before it is known / proven (traditionally called `enunciation').
E.g.  "every even number is the sum of two primes" is not a `proposition'.
 A judgement which is actually known, an `evident' judgement
(`proposition' in the traditional sense in logic):
 A judgement which is immediately evident;
i.e., evident by itself, not through other judgements;
i.e., evident by `intuitive' proof (`axiom').
 A judgement which is made evident
mediately through some previously made evident judgements
(`theorem' in mathematics);
i.e., evident by `discursive' proof.
See also hypothetical judgements below.